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IN THE SUPRE:ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COM:MERCIAL INSURANCE COM-
PANY OF NEW ARK, NEW JERSEY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 9891 
Action by plaintiff insurance company to recover 
from defendant, an intermediary bank which accepted 
for collection for its depositor a settlement draft issued 
by plaintiff bearing the forged endorsement of one of 
two payees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon trial of the case before the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, sitting without a jury, judgment was entered 
against plaintiff and for defendant, no cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT O,N APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's judg-
ment, in opposition to appellant's request for reversal 
of the judgment, or in the alternative a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts must be considered by this 
Court in addition to those correctly summarized in plain-
tiff's statement of facts. The draft issued by plaintiff 
on March 30, 1959, was transmitted to the insured, Al-
burn Holder, dba ((200" Motors, through the office of 
Motor Club Insurance Agency, an agent of plaintiff, on 
April 9, 1959. The endorsement of ((200" Motors was 
authentic, but the endorsement of Keith Walton Body 
Shop was forged prior to April 16, 1959, when the draft 
was deposited to the account of ((200" Motors at the 
Brigham City office of defendant bank. (R. 23) Keith 
Walton Body Shop did not maintain an account of any 
nature with the Brigham City office of defendant bank. 
(R. 42) Several policies of insurance and bonds issued 
to ((200" Motors by plaintiff were cancelled by reason of 
nonpayment of premiums and termination of the business 
of ((200" Motors in June, 1959. (R. 77) Prior to June 26, 
1959, plaintiff through its Salt Lake City office advised 
City Finance Company that the plaintiff's draft issued 
March 30, 1959 in the amount of $624.96 had been paid 
by plaintiff on the endorsements of Keith Walton Body 
Shop and ((200" Motors, and that a copy of the draft 
would be forwarded to City Finance Company. (R. 24) 
At approximately the same time Keith Walton of Keith 
Walton Body Shop informed City Finance Company that 
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he had not received the draft and had not endorsed his 
name thereon. (R. 24) No further inquiries regarding 
the forged endorsement were made until after January 
19, 1961. (R. 24) Defendant was not advised of the 
forgery until July 18, 1961. (R. 25) 
The repairs on the damaged automobile were not 
completed by November 19, 1959, but on or about that 
date, Keith Walton purchased the damaged automobile 
from City Finance in an unrepaired condition by pay-
ment of $600.00. (R. 64) City Finance Company subse-
quently sued plaintiff on October 18, 1961, alleging a 
loss of $624.96, the amount of the draft. On November 
30, 1961, plaintiff paid City Finance Company without 
having answered the complaint, and the case was dis-
missed. ( R. 2 5) 
Alburn Holder, who had received the proceeds from 
the draft bearing the forged endorsement, was released 
from custody on bail on July 17, 1959, ~nd worked in 
Atlanta, Georgia, until shortly before his trial and com-
mitment to federal prison on February 8, 1960. (R. 24) 
Defendant denied liability on plaintiff's claim for 
recovery on the draft and the case came to trial on Janu-
ary 25, 1963. Following the introduction of evidence by 
both parties the Court indicated that all evidence intro-
duced without objection, and the issues raised thereby, 
would have to be considered since the pleadings are deemed 
to be amended to conform to the proof. (R. 100) At the 
request of plaintiff additional time was offered by the 
Court to permit additional evidence if plaintiff deemed it 
necessary, but plaintiff requested no witnesses except those 
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which had already been fully examined by both parties, 
and, therefore, no continuance was granted. (R. 99, 100) 
Judgment was entered in favor of defendant. (R. 14) 
Plaintiff's subsequent motion to amend the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law was granted with respect 
to the Findings of Fact. (R. 21) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY 
LACHES. 
The record of this case clearly indicates that plain-
tiff was guilty of laches by reason of ( 1) its failure to 
act on the facts known by it and make diligent inquiry 
which would have led to conclusive knowledge of the 
forged endorsement, {2) its failure to notify defendant 
immediately when plaintiff knew or should have known 
of the forgery, and ( 3) its failure to notify other parties 
who might have averted the loss, or to pursue the forger 
in its own right if it suffered any loss. There can be 
no question that shortly after the draft containing the 
forged endorsement was returned to plaintiff it had 
knowledge of the forgery or of such facts which should 
have put it on inquiry regarding the forgery. As plain-
tiff's counsel emphatically stated in an opening statement 
to the Court: 
. . . and I would just like to alert the Court to this 
factor at the beginning of the evidence that it will 
not necessarily be when the forgery is committed 
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but when the plaintiff had a duty to act in regard 
to that forgery; ... (R. 40) 
The record indicates that plaintiff's duty to act on 
the forgery arose in June, 1959, well in time for recovery 
of any loss from the person benefitting from the forgery. 
The important sequence of events can be easily traced. 
Plaintiff issued its draft in the amount of $624.96 on or 
about March 30, 1959, made payable to cc200" Motors and 
Keith Walton Body Shop. (R. 23, Par. 5) The draft was 
mailed by the Motor Club Insurance Agency, an agent 
of plaintiff, to cc200" Motors, the insured and one of the 
payees, on April 9, 1959. (R. 71) Shortly thereafter, and 
approximately May 20, 1959, Alburn Holder dba cc200" 
Motors, went out of business. (R. 23, Par. 8) The policy 
of insurance in the name of cc200" Motors was cancelled 
in June, 1959 by reason of nonpayment of premiums, with 
the notation that the firm was going out of business. 
(R. 76) At the same time, a number of other policies of 
insurance or bonds issued by appellant Commercial In-
surance Company of Newark, New Jersey, and originally 
written by the Motor Club Insurance Agency, were can-
celled by reason of ((200" Motors' going out of business. 
Prior to June 26, 1959, the Salt Lake City office of plain-
tiff advised City Finance Company, the loss payee under 
the insurance policy, that plaintiff's draft in the amount 
of $624.96 had been paid on the endorsement of Keith 
Walton Body Shop and cc200" Motors and that a copy 
of the draft would be forwarded to City Finance Com-
pany. (R. 23) The evidence shown in the letter of that 
date is most convincing to prove that by June, 1959, 
plaintiff had knowledge of questions regarding the authen-
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ticity of the endorsements on the draft. The substance 
of the letter of June -26, 1959 is embodied in the Findings 
of Fact, No.9. (R. 23) 
The evidence is binding on plaintiff as well as de-
fendant since the parties stipulated to the admission of 
evidence, including letters, and to the truth of the dates 
on which the letters were sent and other matters indi-
cated therein except observations of the writer. In the 
words of plaintiff's counsel, n ••• but the fact that the 
letter was sent and the obvious facts connected with it 
would be admitted by both parties .... " (R. 40) Since 
plaintiff was unable at pre-trial to indicate the date on 
which it had notice of the forgery, (R. 7), and the sub-
sequent interrogatories were not pertinent, the letters re-
ferred to were admitted without objection to constitute 
the evidence. 
Plaintiff did nothing to pursue the inquiry demanded 
by such knowledge as it possessed in June, 1959, and thus 
failed in its duty to act at that time. Plaintiff must 
nevertheless be charged with such knowledge as would 
have been obtained upon inquiry, and with the conse-
quences of failing to act. The duty to act was first for 
the benefit of plaintiff itself, for if it suffered any loss 
through a chain of events started by the forgery it should 
have sought recovery against the forger. Plaintiff had 
the further duty of informing Keith Walton and City 
Finance Company of the forgery, to permit them to take 
appropriate action if necessary. And most important, 
plaintiff had the duty of informing defendant bank of the 
forgery or of the questions relating to the endorsement, to 
allow defendant ample opportunity for investigation and 
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recovery against the forger in the event defendant be-
came liable for any loss caused thereby. 
It is absolutely clear that more than twenty-five 
months (June, 1959, to July, 1961,) passed before de-
fendant received any knowledge whatever of the forgery. 
(R. 23, 25) No inquiry was made in 1959 of the Motor 
Club Insurance Agency (R. 77), or of City Finance Com-
pany (R. 25). Even though Keith Walton denied re-
ceiving the draft or endorsing his business name thereon 
before June 26, 1959, not until between January and 
March of 1961 did plaintiff inquire about or request 
samples of a signature of Keith Walton for comparison 
with the alleged forgery. (R. 24) The plaintiff mani-
festly did nothing for many months, until pressed by 
the City Finance Company attorney and until it was too 
late to expect any recovery on the draft from the person 
who received the proceeds therefrom. Such conduct is 
the laches for which appellant must be held responsible. 
The Utah Law governing laches is very clear on the 
duty to inquire. In Burningham vs. Burke (1926) 60 
Utah 90, 245 P. 977, the Court declared: 
The law is well settled that a person cannot rescind 
a contract for the purchase or sale of stock for 
fraud either at law or equity if he has been guilty 
of laches or of unreasonable delay, either in discov-
ering the fraud, or in repudiating the contract 
after its discovery, and, if there are facts which 
ought to put a person of ordinary prudence on 
inquiry, the purchaser will be charged with such 
knowledge as would have been obtained upon such 
inquiry . ... 0'rdinarily, whether laches exists is 
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dependent upon the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case. While dela,y is an important 
factor, yet mere delay, unless unreasonable or inex-
cusable, is not enough; and of equal importance are 
the circumstances occurring during the delay, the 
relation of the parties to the subject, disadvantages 
that may hav(! come through the loss of evidence, 
change of title, intervention of equities, or injury 
from other causes. (emphasis added) (245 P. 983) 
The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense not 
controlled by any applicable statute of limitations, but is 
really a matter of balancing equities between the parties, 
Potash C01nPany of America vs. International Minerals 
and Chemical Corporation (CCA lOth Circuit 1954) 
213 Fed. 2d 153. In that case the Court sustained a 
defense of laches in a patent infringement case. In 
so doing it declared: 
To constitute laches two elements must exist: 
First, inexcusable delay in instituting suit and sec-
ond, prejudice resulting to the defendant from 
such delay. The existence of laches does not depend 
merely upon the lapse of time, but also upon 
the equities presented in the case. . . . But 
ignorance will not of itself excuse delay. The 
party must be diligent and make such inquiry 
and investigation as the circumstances reasonably 
suggest, and the means of knowledge are generally 
equivalent to actual knowledge. (Citations) 
In all of the following cases, the defense of laches 
was upheld to defeat an attempt by the maker of a check 
to recover against a collecting hank which had paid on 
the forged endorsement of at least one payee, all of the 
cases agreeing that the statute of limitations does not 
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govern a defense of laches: National Bank of the Repub-
lic of Chicago vs. Kaspar American State Bank ( 19 3 8) 
369 Ill. 34, 15 N.E. 2d 721; Goodyear Tire f5 Rubber Co. 
of Calif. vs. First Nat. Bank of Denver (1934) 95 Colo. 
34, 32 P. 2d 268; U. S. v. National City Bank of New 
York (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 28 Fed. Supp. 144. 
As to the second element of laches, or the detri-
ment suffered because of plaintiff's failures, defendant 
submits that it is clearly shown by the record. Alburn 
Holder, dba ((200" Motors presented the draft for col-
lection at the Brigham City office of respondent, and 
received the value from the draft by reason of the credit 
to its account with respondent. (R. 23) 
On June 12, 1959, a warrant for the arrest of Alburn 
Holder was issued, and within five days thereafter he 
was taken into custody, a preliminary hearing was held, 
and Holder was released on bond of $3,500.00 (R. 24, 
Par. 10) Mr. Holder lived and worked in Atlanta, 
Georgia, from the time he was released on bond until 
shortly before February 8, 1960, at which time he was 
sentenced and committed for thirty months. (R. 24) 
Evidently, for a period of at least six months Mr. Holder 
was working and earning money. He hired for his de-
fense counsel in the criminal actions Mr. Joseph P. Mc-
Carthy, Salt Lake City, and paid him a retainer by cash. 
(R. 74) The availability of cash from Mr. Holder 
conclusively proves that defendant, had it been deter-
mined liable, could have obtained reimbursement of the 
value of the forged draft, or at least part of the same, 
had it been advised by plaintiff of the forgery during 
those crucial months preceding February, 1960, when 
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Mr. Holder was committed to a federal penitentiary. 
That is all the prejudice defendant had to show, for it is 
not necessary to prove that benefit would certainly have 
accrued to the bank from an attempt to secure payment 
from the forger, so long as the availability of the forger 
was indicated. Union Trust Co. v. Soble (Md. 1949) 64 
Atl. 2d 744. 
No doubt can exist that defendant bank was preju-
diced by plaintiff's failure to advise it promptly of the 
forgery. Plaintiff must therefore be deemed guilty of 
laches, and the judgment of the trial court can be af-
firmed on that basis. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
PLAINTIFF'S MO·TION TO~ AMEND ITS CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW BASED ON THE AMENDED FIND-
INGS OF FACT. 
The trial court correctly concluded that City 
Finance Company had been guilty of laches, and that by 
reason thereof plaintiff had a valid defense to the claim 
asserted against it which was not raised in the suit be-
tween those parties. (R. 27) This issue was discussed 
by Court and counsel during argument (R. 96), and after 
plaintiff declined the opportunity of calling witnesses 
to testify on that issue (R. 100) the Court subsequently 
based its judgment on that ground. Since plaintiff's mo-
tion to amend the Findings of Fact was granted, (R. 21) 
the record as it stands must be taken as constituting the 
complete evidence. Even if plaintiff itself were not 
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guilty of laches, it ts charged with the laches of City 
Finance Company. 
The record clearly shows that prior to June 26, 
1959, City Finance Company, the loss payee under the 
policy issued by plaintiff, knew that Keith Walton Body 
Shop had not received payment for the loss on the auto-
mobile, that the insurer had issued a draft payable to 
Keith Walton Body Shop and u200" Motors, and that 
Keith Walton denied ever receiving the draft or en-
dorsing his name thereon. (R. 23, 24) Defendant submits 
that such information is sufficient knowledge of the 
forgery in and of itself. One of the incredible aspects 
of the case is the fact that for many months City Finance 
Company did not make any inquiries of plaintiff or of 
any other party, failing in that regard as plaintiff itself 
had failed. City Finance Company made no claim against 
plaintiff until December 22, 1960, one and one-half years 
after the knowledge of the forgery was almost certainly 
possessed. (R. 24) And the City Finance Company 
action to recover from plaintiff was not commenced until 
October, 1961. (R. 25) 
In thus failing to make any inquiry or investigation 
for an unreasonably long period after it had knowledge 
of the forged endorsement, City Finance Company de-
prived all parties from any opportunity to recover a loss 
from the person who received the proceeds from the draft. 
If City Finance Company had acted promptly after 
June, 1959, the forgery could have been exposed very 
quickly and whichever party suffered a loss could have 
recovered all or part of the value of the draft from Al-
burn Holder of u200" Motors, who until at least January, 
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1960, was working and earntng money tn Atlanta, 
Georgia, ( R. 7 5 ) . 
In accordance with those fa.cts, defendant submits 
that the laches of City Finance Company must be 
charged to Commercial Insurance Company in this ac-
tion. The first reason therefor is privity between the 
parties. In Meeks vs. MeekS (1944) 245 Ala. 559, 18 So. 
2d 260, the Court held that generally speaking a plaintiff 
may be barred from relief by the laches of one with whom 
he stands in privity. See to the same effect, Williams Coke 
Co. vs. Spears (19)8) 277 Ky. 57, 125 SW 2d 745. 
In Gillons et al. vs. Shell Company of California 
(CCA 9th Circuit 1936) 86 Fed. 2d 600, the Court sus-
tained a decree dismissing a complaint alleging patent 
infringements, on the ground that the laches of the plain-
tiff's predecessor in interest could be properly imputed 
to plaintiff. That Court held: 
At the outset, it will be helpful that we place our 
inquiry into its proper setting. It must be borne 
in mind that the decision of the trial court on the 
subject of laches cannot be set aside unless it is 
palpably wrong. (Citations) 
As the decisions indicate, a question of laches is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, 
and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an 
abuse of discretion. ( 8 6 Fed. 2d 604) 
Also, in Hart v. Northeastern N.M. Fair Ass'n. (1953) 
58 N.M. 9, 265 P. 2d 341, the Court held that the trial 
judge's decision on laches should be affirmed unless it 
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is palpably wrong. In the case at bar no abuse of discre-
tion can be shown in determining the laches of City 
Finance Company, for the evidence in the record clearly 
supports the judgment on that ground. 
It is undisputed that City Finance Company and 
Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 
were in privity because of the contract of insurance 
between them, and that plaintiff's alleged loss arose be-
cause it recognized that contract and reimbursed the loss 
payee for an expenditure made on an insured automobile. 
Although the cases cited above usually involved a grantor-
grantee privity, the same rule would apply where the 
loss of appellant occurred only by payment of a claim 
to a contract privy, thereby ((buying" the right of action 
from its predecessor. The appellant suffered no loss 
whatever except by such payments. It would be grossly 
unjust to allow recovery against the bank of an alleged 
loss which plaintiff could have prevented by asserting a 
valid defense. There was certainly no surprise on this 
issue, for plaintiff admits that its counsel considered the 
claim of City Finance Company and decided that it was 
valid. (R. 25) Plaintiff's failure to raise a valid defense 
then cannot prejudice defendant now. 
Defendant further asserts that the laches of City 
Finance Company was a valid defense which plaintiff 
could have raised irrespective of whether such laches is 
imputed to plaintiff in the legal sense, for if the delay 
of City Finance Company in taking action on its knowl-
edge of the forgery caused detriment to plaintiff, the loss 
arising thereby could not be imposed on plaintiff. It 
therefore paid City Finance Company as a volunteer, 
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and without legal compulsion, and it cannot pass on to 
defendant a loss so incurred. On either ground, the judg-
ment of the trial court must be sustained. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED SINCE BOTH PARTIES HAD 
FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
ON EVERY ISSUE AND THE EVIDENCE AD-
DUCED FULLY SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT. 
Plain tiff was not taken by surprise when the Court, 
at the time of argument, discussed the issue of the laches 
o£ City Finance Company. The record conclusively shows 
that the issue was raised early in the trial when the Court 
and counsel were discussing some exhibits introduced by 
defendant: 
The Court: I have looked at them. I take it all 
he is trying to prove is that the records of the 
City Finance show that as of a certain date the 
City Finance Company knew there was a forgery 
involved on this check. 
Mr. Wadsworth: I see. I misunderstood. . . . 
(R. 60) 
Plaintiff surely cannot be surprised to learn it had 
a defense to the claim of City Finance. The laches of 
City Finance Company has been clearly shown from 
the record in that it knew before June 26, 1959, that 
Keith Walton denied having received the draft or en-
dorsing his name thereon even though the draft had been 
cashed on the purported endorsements of uzoo" Motors 
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and Keith Walton Body Shop. (R. 23, 34) Yet City 
Finance Company did nothing by way of further inquiry 
or notification of any party until December 22, 1960, 
nearly a year after opportunity for recovery from Al-
burn Holder was terminated by his imprisonment. 
(R. 24) 
Upon the close of evidence counsel for plaintiff was 
awarded opportunity for opening the argument, even 
though defendant had opened with proof. The follow-
ing excerpts from the conversation between counsel and 
Court indicate withol,lt question that counsel for both 
parties were aware of the issues raised by the evidence 
and that plaintiff had opportunity to offer new evidence 
if it desired, but in reality had no more evidence to offer 
since· the only witnesses plaintiff requested had already 
been on the stand: 
The Court: I thought when we started the only 
thing we were going to have was a matter of 
laches, but it seems to me there may be other 
issues raised by the proof, and you may have the 
first and last talk on this matter, Mr. Wadsworth. 
(Argument by Mr. Wadsworth) 
The Court: Let's see. If he can show laches, we 
. don't need to bother about the other things. I 
thought the knowledge had by your insured would 
be knowledge that you would have and you would 
stand in the identical boat of this insured. In fact, 
if the insured waited an unreasonable time to 
make his claim to you you ought not have paid 
him. You should have said, ((Listen brother, I 
can't recover from that other fellow because of 
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laches, and I'm not going to pay you." If that 
isn't the law, I ought to be advised about that now, 
but I guess you are prepared about that, since that 
was the question you had. (R. 96) 
(Further argument by Mr. Wadsworth) 
* * * 
The Court: I want counsel to state for the record 
what additional proof he would want to put in on 
that, because if I am going to have additional 
proof, you would need to make your argument 
over, because I would forget it then anyway. What 
would you need by way of continuance and proof 
if I should rule against you in the matter of laches? 
Mr. Wadsworth: If your Honor would rule 
against me on the matter of laches, I am out. 
(R. 98) 
* * * 
Mr. Wadsworth: Well, your Honor, I don't know 
what the Court wants in this regard. 
The Court: I don't want a thing. I just wondered 
if the evidence had come in that scared you. If 
you weren't scared, if there isn't anything to this 
that I suggested, I probably will catch on to it 
after a while. If you need time, you tell into the 
record what time you need and what witnesses 
you would expect to call. (R. 99) 
* * * 
Mr. Wadsworth: I see, your Honor. Well, I 
would want to call-to recall Mr. Keith Walton 
and the present manager of the City Finance 
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probably subpoena the records of City Finance, 
and possibly Mr. Wells of Fore Loyalty Group. 
The Court: Well I wouldn't continue it for Keith 
Walton. He was here. He testified, and he is the 
boy that raised the problem. 
Mr. Wadsworth: Your Honor, I was surprised on 
this issue. I didn't know that that was an issue at the 
time he was here, so I had no opportunity to cross-
examine him on that point. 
The Court: You had opportunity. He was here. 
Mr. Wadsworth: That issue hadn't been raised 
at that time your Honor. 
Mr. Allen: The evidence raised the issue. 
Mr. Wadsworth: We were still trying under this 
issue of laches that the pre-trial order set out. 
The Court: There is a rule of Court that says 
regardless of what your issues are, your pleadings 
are deemed to be amended to comply to proof. 
When his proof came in, that raised, if it did, if 
it raised an issue at all, it was raised by his testi-
mony regardless of what the pleadings theretofor 
had been. The present manager of the City 
Finance, has he been on the stand today? 
Mr. Allen: Yes. That was Mr. Brooks, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Well I guess you couldn't get a con-
tinuance on that ground. I will take the matter 
under advisement on the evidence given. (R. 99, 
100) 
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It is most significant that the Court stated that 
knowledge had by the insured (referring to City Finance 
Company as loss payee) would be knowledge that the 
insurer would have and the insurer would stand in the 
identical boat of the insured, and that if the insured 
waited an unreasonable time to make its claim the insurer 
ought not to have paid him. That is the precise ground 
upon which the Court later based its judgment. Evi-
dently, plaintiff was not surprised by the issue. Plaintiff 
must be bound by the evidence adduced at trial as con-
tained in the present record. Defendant submits that no 
prejudicial error was committed by the Court, and that 
a new trial would serve no purpose whatever. The judg-
ment of the trial court should be sustained and its re-
fusal to grant a new trial affirmed. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF DID NO'T PROVE A CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANT UPON WHICH RELIEF 
COULD BE GRANTED. 
Several additional grounds for ·affirming the judg-
ment may appropriately be noted in accordance with the 
fundamental law that where the conclusion reached by 
the trial court is correct, the judgment will be affirmed 
on review irrespective of the trial court's reasons for the 
judgment. Rasmussen vs. Davis (1953) 1 Ut. 2d 96, 
262 P. 2d 488, Fisher vs. Bank of Spanish Fork (1937) 93 
Ut. 514, 74 P. 2d 659, North American Accident Insur-
ance Company vs. Tebbs (CCA lOth Circuit 1939) 107 
Fed. 2d 853. 
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As to the basic law governing plaintiff's right of 
action against defendant, plaintiff has cited 7 Am. Jur., 
Banks, Sec. 594. That section also declares: 
In a few cases, though, recovery from a bank on 
a check received with a forged endorsement and 
collected from the drawee bank has been denied 
the drawer because of the particular circumstances. 
Defendant submits that the facts of this case set 
up the particular circumstances under which the drawer 
should be precluded from recovering against the collect-
ing bank which paid on the forged endorsement of one 
of two payees. 
The following cases deny recovery by a maker of a 
check or draft against a collecting bank paying out on a 
forged endorsement, on the grounds that no right of 
action exists in the :first instance, or that payment by 
the bank does not cause the loss to plaintiff: Provident 
Savings Bank and Trust Co. vs. Fifth-Third Union Trust 
Co. (1932) 43 Ohio App. 533, 183 NE 885; National 
Surety Company vs. City Bank and Trust Company 
(1945) 248 Wis. 32, 20 NW 2d 559; Trojan Publishing 
Corp. vs. Manufacturers Trust Co. ( 1948) 298 N.Y. 771, 
83 NE 2d 465. 
It is clear from the record that Keith Walton had 
not completed the repairs of the automobile at the time he 
was informed that ((200" Motors had ((folded up" (R. 
62) , and had done no more work prior to purchasing the 
car from City Finance Company on November 19, 1959. 
(R. 24) Keith Walton Body Shop was therefore not 
entitled to the proceeds of the draft. Accordingly, City 
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Finance Company was under no legal obligation to pay 
Keith Walton Body Shop, but did so of its own accord 
because he had the automobile in his possession and he 
would not surrender it without being paid something 
for whatever may have been done up to that point. 
Plaintiff could have raised that defense, together with 
the defense of laches, but failed to do either. Plaintiff's 
contract with its loss payee did not compel it to pay in-
valid claims, or as a volunteer. Although the trial court 
did not place its judgment on that particular ground, 
the Court evidently felt that Keith Walton was entitled 
to no money as shown by the following excerpts from 
the record: 
Mr. Wadsworth: There has been no showing that 
there is anything close to laches. 
The Court: Wait a minute. This non-suit works 
both ways. You have moved for it, and it goes 
against you as well as them. You agreed to some-
thing at the pre-trial that appears not to be so. 
It appears Walton had not made the repairs and 
did not make the repairs and that the man who 
put his name on the check didn't owe Walton the 
payments, so that ought to take you out, oughtn't 
it? 
::- * * 
The Court: It seems to me this company did not 
owe Keith Walton one dime. They put his name 
on there to protect the insured, but they did not 
owe Keith Walton, and Keith Walton couldn't 
have sued them for any money. (R. 8 6, 8 8) 
As a corollary principle, it must also be emphasized 
that plaintiff in the first instance made the draft payable 
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to u200" Motors (A loss payee under the policy) and to 
Keith Walton Body Shop (to whom no duty was owed), 
but failed and neglected to make the draft also payable 
to City Finance Company (as loss payee to whom an 
obligation was owed). City Finance Company as loss 
payee was not included as a party on the draft because 
of the recommendation of the independent insurance ad-
justing company, the Scott-Wetzel Company that a draft 
for $624.96 be issued payable to H200" Motors and Keith 
Walton Body Shop. (R. 67, 68) Mr. Wells, plaintiff's 
employee, testified that in causing a draft to be prepared 
for his signature he would ask the secretary to type it up 
according to the information furnished by the adjusting 
agency. (R. 82) Plaintiff thus left itself open for a claim 
of the very nature involved in this action by failing to 
protect the loss payee. Mr. Brooks, the manager of City 
Finance Company, testified that the City Finance Com-
pany always looks to the insurance company for payment 
of a loss and expects its name to be on the draft by reason 
of its status as a loss payee. (R. 58) Plaintiff cannot 
take advantage of its own negligence in asserting an al-
leged loss against defendant bank. 
It is also clear that if Keith Walton were entitled 
to money which he didn't receive because of a forgery 
of his endorsement, he would be the real party in interest 
against defendant bank, and not the plaintiff. The payee 
whose endorsement is forged has the right of action 
against a cashing bank. Esponda vs. Ogden State Bank 
(1929) 75 Ut. 117, 283 P. 729. 
The judgment of the trial court may thus be af-
firmed on one or more of several alternative grounds. 
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CONCLUSIO·N 
Plaintiff had knowledge of the forged endorsement 
on its draft, or had knowledge of such facts as would have 
led to conclusive discovery of the forgery if plaintiff had 
not failed to pursue diligent inquiry, as early as June 26, 
1959, some seven months prior to the date on which 
Alburn Holder, the person benefitting from the forgery, 
was last available for recovery against him. Plaintiff 
failed to act either on its own behalf or in notifying de-
fendant bank of the forged instrument until twenty-five 
months later, thus depriving defendant of opportunity 
to recover from Mr. Holder. In balancing the equities 
between the parties, it clearly appears that plaintiff was 
guilty of laches through an unreasonable delay resulting 
in prejudice to the defendant. 
Even if that were not so, City Finance COmpany, the 
loss payee under plaintiff's policy of insurance, was guilty 
of laches by its prejudicial failure to notify plaintiff of 
the forged endorsement until all chance of recovery was 
eliminated. City Finance COmpany had certain knowl-
edge of the forgery prior to June 26, 1959, and waited 
until December 22, 1960 before making demand on 
plaintiff for the loss allegedly suffered. Such laches is 
imputable to plaintiff by ·reason of the privity between 
those parties. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise as 
defenses to paying City Finance Company, the laches 
of City Finance Company and its negligence in paying 
Keith Walton Body Shop when it appeared he was not 
entitled to the money. 
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Plaintiff had full opportunity to present evidence 
on every issue raised by defendant's evidence and con-
sidered by the Court, and therefore the trial court was 
correct in denying a new trial. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in 
every respect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Don B. Allen 
300 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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